Few empirical studies of the economics of crime have doubted the deterrent effects of the legal sanctions on crime. Those studies, however, have not established a definitive understanding of the effects of labor market conditions on crime. In this paper, we examine the impact of labor market conditions, represented by either male civilian unemployment or labor force participation rates, on seven major categories of crime, using the quarterly crime-rate data for the United States.
I. Introduction
Since the seminal work of Becker [3] , there has been, in studies of the economics of crime, a considerable amount of theoretical and empirical analysis of the effects of legal sanctions on criminal activities (e.g., Block and Heineke [4] ; Ehrlich [7) and [8] ; Hoenack and Weller [161; Schmidt and Witte [24] ). While most previous empirical studies agree on the deterrent effects of legal sanctions on crime1, there is yet to be a definitive statement about the effects of labor market conditions on the crime rate. The statistical significance and sign of the unemployment-rate--crime--rate relation surprisingly vary from one empirical study to another. If there is an unemployment rate effect on the crime rate, the spillover effect of the unemployment rate on the crime rate is too important for the makers of public policy to ignore. Therefore, the empirical relationships between labor market conditions and the crime rate deserve more careful attention and clarification.
There are, in our opinion, two major drawbacks to previous empirical studies of the crime rate and labor market conditions. First, most of the empirical models did not allow for the lagged effects of the unemployment rate on the crime rate.2 One can easily discover from the crime-rate data for the last decades that the crime rate has had cyclical and lagged behavior, varying over the business cycles. We will show that this lag specification -2-is significant. Second, it is not likely that the models are free of a strong multicollinearity between the unemployment rate and other explanatory variables, e.g., income distribution and wages. Unemployment usually affects unskilled workers, minority groups, and secondary workers, and thereby exacerbates income inequality. A given level of unemployment rate is likely to influence not only the rate of change, but also the level of wage rates in the labor market. In our view, a lag specification on the unemployment rate variable and multicollinearity between the unemployment rate and other explanatory variables in a crime supply function are primarily responsible for the inconclusive empirical results in past analyses of the unemployment-rate--crime-rate relation.
The purpose of this study is to re-examine the relationships between the unemployment rate (and, the labor force participation rate) and the crime rate by using a different methodology from that used in most previous empirical studies. We apply time series techniques developed by Granger [13] and Sims [25] to quarterly time series data on the male civilian unemployment and labor force participation rates and the rates of seven categories of crime: murder, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft. An application of the time series methodology is intuitively appealing as a way of analyzing the significance and sign of the unemployment effects on these crime rates as well as the timing of changes in these crime rates in response to changes in labor market conditions.
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The period of analysis for this study is from the first quarter of 1970 to the fourth quarter of, 1983 in the United States. There are a number of reasons why we choose this period for study.
First, during this period, there have been significant fluctuations in male civilian unemployment rates for almost all age groups, and similarly there have been significant fluctuations in male civilian labor force participation rates, especially for youths under the age of twenty. Second, the crime rates mentioned above all experienced an unprecedentedly rapid rise during this period, except for the last three years.3 Finally, few empirical studies on the unemployment-rate--crime-rate relation have covered the period that we analyze.
The organization of the subsequent sections of this study is as follows: Section II is a brief review of the previous empirical findings on the unemployment-rate--crime-rate relation.
Section III describes the time series techniques applied to observe dynamic relationships between variables in a system. Section IV reports the empirical results. Finally, Section V gives the conclusion of this study.
II. A Review of the Previous Findings
Changes in labor market conditions alter an individual's expected earning opportunities from legal market activities.
Smaller opportunity costs due to unemployment would increase the incentive for an individual to commit a crime as an alternative pecuniary source and/or some form of psychic gratification.
Despite the plausibility of this argument, both time series and cross-sectional analyses have found two contrasting empirical interpretations of the relationships between the unemployment rate and the crime rate.
First, time series analyses of the unemployment-rate--crimerate relation for the United States display a wide variation in their findings. Fleisher [9] found the effect of the male civilian unemployment rate on juvenile delinquency to be positive and significant using data from Boston, Cincinnati, and Chicago Supporting a view that murder is often a by-product of crimes involving material gain, Ehrlich [8] , using the U.S. annual data for the period between 1933 and 1969, reported a significantly positive unemployment rate effect on murder. However, by reexamining a sample period similar to Ehrlich's, Hoenack and Weiler [16] reported that neither unemployment nor labor force participation rates have statistically significant effects on murder-rates and consequently rejected the Ehrlich findings.
Since a labor-force-participation-rate--crime--rate relation appears, in general, statistically stronger than an unemploymentrate--crime-rate relation in time series studies, Freeman [11] claims that "... those who leave the labor force are the most crime prone (p. 10)." This view is strongly supported by the evidence that labor market opportunities measured by labor force participation rates are the major factor for explaining the increasing property crime rates for youths for the period from 1953 to 1967 in the United States (Phillips, et al. [21] ). Also, Ehrlich [7] indicates that the labor force participation rate could represent an index of the total time spent in legitimate market activities.
Second, cross-sectional analyses of the unemployment-rate--crime-rate relation are inconclusive on the unemployment rate effect. Fleisher [10] found the male civilian unemployment rate to be a cause of juvenile delinquent behavior in the seventy- In Ehrlich's analysis of property and violent crime rates for 1960 across the United States, the variable of the unemployment rate of civilian urban males, ages fourteen to twenty-four, has virtually no effect on the crime rate (Ehrlich [71) . The study found statistically significant labor-force-participation-rate--crime-rate relation: positive effects on the larceny and auto theft rates and negative effects on the murder and rape rates. 6 Ehrlich [7] gives two reasons why the unemployment rate variable is not significant at all. First, the unemployment rate among the age group from fourteen to twenty-four is predominantly voluntary unemployment due to the search for desirable employment. Second, the variables for the unemployment rate and income inequality (measured by the percentage of families below one-half of median income) are highly correlated with each other in the regressions since an increase in unemployment rates is likely to aggravate income inequality by disproportionately affecting those people with lower schooling and job experiences.
Using data from fifty-three municipalities with 1960 populations ranging from 25,000 to 200,000, Sjoquist [26] We notice that, so far, the empirical results of these studies of the unemployment-rate--crime-rate relation are still ambiguous and highly sensitive to the specification of a crime supply function. To clarify this anthiguity and overcome this sensitivity, we will propose a quasi-reduced form of a crime model in the following section.7
III. Statistical Model
In this section, we illustrate the statistical methodology used in our analysis of the unemployment (and, labor force participation) -rate--crime-rate relation.
Assume a particular crime rate observed at time t, Y(t), has two components:
where Y and represent normal and cyciical components, respectively. The normal component Y would be explained in a structural model, which includes a crime supply function, the production functions of the probabilities of arrest, of conviction, and of punishment, and public expenditure functions (e.g., Greenwood and Wadycki [14] ; Hoenack and Weiler [16] ).
Here we assume that the lagged crime rate in question, Y, another related, lagged crime rate, Y*, and trend T capture the normal component n' while the lagged unemployment rate Ti represents the cyclical component
In a vector autoregressive model, we will have a vector autoregressive representation (hereafter, VAR) as follows: (2) and An estimation of equation (3) simultaneously with equation (2) in the VAR, will make it statistically possible to simulate future responses in the crime rate in question, Y, to random shocks in the innovation in unemployment rate, U. In a theoretical sense, a rationale for equation (3) can be found in Witte [30] : "... To test whether the current crime rate in question, Y(t) , can be predicted by the past unemployment rates, the null hypothesis is set that C(•) in equation (2) should be zero if there is no Granger-causality from the unemployment rate to the crime rate.9
Since the estimated distributed lag coefficients for C() include complicated cross-equation feedbacks, the sum of the estimated C() does not yield a total impact of the unemployment rate on the crime rate. Sims [25] suggests estimating a moving average representation (hereafter, MAR) instead, in order to observe responses in the crime rate to the unemployment rate.
A particular i-th equation, e.g., a murder equation, in the The unemployment rate variable assumes male civilian unemployment rates for those sixteen to seventeen years old (U1617), eithteen to nineteen years old (U1819), twenty to twenty-four years old (U2024), and twenty-five years old and over (U25).
On the other hand, in an analysis of the labor-force-participation-rate--crime-rate relation, the labor force participation rate variable assumes male civilian labor force participation rates for whites, sixteen to nineteen years old (WL1619) and twenty years old and over (WL2O), and for non-whites, sixteen to nineteen years old (NWL1619) and twenty years old and over (NWL2O) 12 The system in a vector autoregressive model consists of four unemployment (or labor force participation) rates, and two crime rates, variables, all of which are expressed in logarithms. The lag length in the variables is assumed to be the same, i.e., four lag distributions, based on our preliminary work. A parti- and is statistically significant in explaining the behavior of all the crime rates except the larceny-theft rate (LARC).
[ Table 1-li The robust relationships between U25 and the various crime rates would indicate that high unemployment rates among this age group are largely due to involuntary unemployment, which causes the individual male or his family to feel insecure and reduces the acquisition of market goods and services with legitimate family earnings. These circumstances would increase the incentive to commit crimes.
The results for the male civilian unemployment rates among youths, e.g., among those sixteen to seventeen years old (U16l7) and those eighteen to nineteen years old (U1819), are relatively disappointing. The weak association between the unemployment rate among youths and the crime rate, however, conforms with previous findings, supporting the view that the unemployment rate among -lLteenager groups is predominantly voluntary unemployment due to the search for desired employment. the position that an increase in the unemployment rate among the prime-age males (twenty-five years old and over) will necessarily raise the overall crime rate in the society.
[ Table 1- 2] In terms of "marginal" responses in the crime rate from quarter to quarter in Table 1 In other words, an increase in MURD due to a rise in U25 is mostly realized within the first four quarters ahead, i.e., one year. We can find similar results for all other crime rates except the larceny-theft rate (LARC). Table 2 -1 lists the F-statistics on the male civilian labor force participation rate variables--WL2O, NWL2O, WL1619, and NWL1619--based on the Granger-causality tests. We note the importance of the labor force participation rate of whites, sixteen to nineteen years old (WLl6l9), and that of non-whites, sixteen to nineteen years old (NWL1619), in predicting the behavior of the various crime rates. It is quite noteworthy that NWL1619
Granger-causes most of the crime rates: MURD, ROBB, ASSA, BURG, and AUTO. These statistically prominent associations between [ Tables 2-1 Table 2 -2 reports the cumulative responses in the rates of the seven categories of crime to a one standard deviation shock in the innovation in NWL1619. The responses in the crime rates are predominantly negative for the various quarters ahead considered.
That is, a fall in the labor force participation rate of non-whites, sixteen to nineteen years old (NWL1619), triggers all the crime rates to rise various quarters ahead. Our findings, therefore, strongly support Freeman's claim that youths who leave the labor market are the most crime prone (Freeman [11] ). The male civilian unemployment rates, especially the rate for those twenty-five years old and over, are strongly associated with most of the crime rates studied. An increase in the unemployment rate of those twenty-five years old and over clearly triggers a subsequent increase in all the crime rates, whose peaks are reached within a few years. The definite spillover effects of the unemployment rate on the various crime rates suggest that a carefully designed implementation of general macroeconomic policies aimed at reducing unemployment rates would contribute to reducing crime rates. This, however, does not imply that legal sanctions on crime might not be more effective.
The male civilian labor force participation rates are also found to be related to the crime rates considered here. Youth labor force participation rates for both whites and non-whites, sixteen to nineteen years old, are more strongly associated with the examined crime rates than are the labor force participation rates for males, twenty years old and over. The complexity of 1. Some of the deterrent effects are due to changes in the probabilities of arrest, of conviction, and of punishment, and also to changes in the severity of punishment.
2. The cross-sectional analyses are assumed to be based on a sample in long run equilibrium and consequently provide no information on the unemployment rate's lagged effects on the crime rate. 8. An abbreviation is used in the text.
9. Granger [13] defines causality between two stationary stochastic time series, X(t) and Y(t), within a set of information in the universe as follows: A time series X causes another time series Y if the current value of Y is more accurately predicted by using the information that includes at least the own-past series of Y and the past series of X, than by using the information that excludes the past series of X. 14. The estimated cumulative responses are one-tenth smaller than those values reported in Tables 1-2 and 2-2. As long as the interpretation is made in terms of percentages, there is no qualitative change. See Litterman [18] for the interpretation.
15. The decomposition of variance in the crime rate measures the degree of interaction between the crime rate and the unemployment rate. A formula of the decomposition of variance can be found in Litterman [18] , p. 79. 
